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From International Law to Jessup’s Transnational Law,
From Transnational Law to Transnational Legal Orders
By Gregory Shaffer and Carlos Coye 1

A.

INTRODUCTION

In his path breaking 1956 Storrs Lectures, Judge Philip Jessup shifted attention from
international law, as governing relations between states, to transnational law, as governing
transnational activities. He famously defined transnational law as “all law which regulates actions
or events that transcend national frontiers,” which includes public international law, private
international law, and “other rules which do not wholly fit into such standard categories.” 2 Much
recent scholarship on transnational law has focused on that residual category of “other rules” and
their “private” character. 3 There has, however, been a parallel revolution in public international
law since Jessup’s lectures, which needs to be theorized in transnational terms. It is best done
through shifting attention from the concept of transnational law to the concepts of transnational
legal ordering and transnational legal orders.
Jessup wrote of the concept of transnational law as problem solving during the Cold War
when hope in public international law and public international institutions had withered. Jessup
had served on the United States delegation to both the 1943 Bretton Woods conference that led to
the creation of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, and the 1945 San Francisco
charter conference that created the United Nations. By 1956, however, the prospect of international
institutions and international law as problem-solvers had collapsed. Jessup himself had been
investigated and attacked as a communist sympathizer by U.S. Senator Joseph McCarthy,
undermining Jessup’s reputation and explaining the Senate’s refusal to approve him as the U.S.
representative to the United Nations. 4 Jessup turned to analyze other means of fostering
international problem solving through the concept of transnational law that incorporated, but went
beyond public international law. Jessup’s lectures focused primarily on private international law.
As reflected in his three lectures’ titles (“The Universality of Human Problems,” “The Power to
Deal with the Problems,” and “The Choice of Law Governing the Problems”), Jessup was drawn
to private international law’s functional ability to resolve individual transnational “problems”
(lecture 1) through its decentralized system of allocating jurisdictional “power” among national
courts (lecture 2), which, in turn, use “choice of law” techniques to decide on the applicable law
(lecture 3).
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This article has two main targets for its audience: first, it responds to theorists who conceive
of transnational law either exclusively or predominately as a private lawmaking phenomenon, and
second, it addresses the relation of public international law to the concepts of transnational legal
ordering and transnational legal orders. The article’s thesis is two-fold. First, the scope of public
international law has exploded since Jessup’s time, arguably more than the other two prongs of his
conceptualization. 5 Second, we should shift our conceptual analysis from transnational law as a
body of law addressing transnational problems, to transnational legal ordering and transnational
legal orders, so as to capture these processes’ deeper political, social, and legal implications. The
term transnational legal ordering refers to the transnational construction, flow, settlement, and
unsettlement of legal norms in particular domains. 6 By transnational legal orders, we mean “a
collection of formalized legal norms and associated organizations and actors that authoritatively
order the understanding and practice of law across national jurisdictions” in these domains. 7 These
developments in public international law and their implications have catalyzed a populist backlash,
which could, at least in the near term, lead to a renewed turn toward the other two prongs of
Jessup’s concept, private international law and private rulemaking (Part E).
This article shows how public international law has become a much more central
component of transnational law and transnational legal ordering since Jessup wrote, and now
increasingly permeates state boundaries. Formally, international law does so when it has direct
effect in national legal systems, when it is enacted by state legislatures in statutes or adopted by
state regulators as administrative regulations, and when it shapes national courts’ interpretation of
national law. 8 Informally, public international law also has significant effects through iterative
processes engaging international organizations, soft law norms, indicators, information-sharing,
expert consultation, peer review, and other technologies of governance that facilitate social
interaction and produce and diffuse knowledge, norms, and practices that transnationally shape
law and legal ordering. Private actors are central in driving the development and application of
international law, as when they participate in norm-making that is eventually incorporated into
international law, when they bring claims before national courts derived from international law,
and through their practices that apply and interpret these norms.
The result is much deeper implications of international law than ad hoc problem solving
applied to transnational situations as theorized by Jessup. International law deeply implicates what
the state does (in relation to the market and social ordering), states’ institutional architecture (by
affecting the allocation of authority among executives, legislatures, courts, administrative bodies,
To recall, the three prongs are public international law, private international law, and other rules.
Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Ordering and State Change, in: Gregory Shaffer (ed.), TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDERING AND STATE CHANGE (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 1, 5-9.
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and central and federal institutions), the role of professions and private parties in governance
(creating new professional stakes), mechanisms of accountability (including to international
bodies and transnational networks of public officials and private stakeholders), and social
identities. 9
This article follows Jessup in asserting that real-world problems should be the starting point
for analysis. However, it problematizes the conceptualization of problems as involving human
agency, so that the problems themselves should be viewed as social and political constructs that,
in turn, shape legal responses. With Jessup, we also contend that public international law is a part
of the study of transnational law. Yet we build from his analysis by focusing on international law’s
permeation of national legal systems and local practices so that international law is not viewed on
a separate plain, as conventionally viewed in the international relations/international law
scholarship, but rather as part of a recursive transnational legal process. 10 While a major prong of
transnational legal theorizing rightly focuses on private law and private lawmaking (which are
important and critical areas of study), public law components of transnational law also remain
central and critically important. 11
B.

THE CONCEPTUAL TURN FROM TRANSNATIONAL LAW TO TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDERS: TWO EXAMPLES

Once we turn from assessing transnational law as law applied to transnational problems to
assessing processes of transnational legal ordering and the development of transnational legal
orders, we cannot start with a stipulated problem, but must ask how that problem was framed.
Problems are not natural since issues can exist for long periods before they are conceptualized as
problems, much less as “transnational problems.” That conceptualization reflects shifting
ideologies and interests over time. 12 Law responds to such conceptualizations, and thus the very
definition of a problem shapes the ensuing legal response to it. This section illustrates our thesis
with two examples, one involving powerful actors and the other marginalized groups, and both
engaging a combination of bottom-up, top-down, and recursive processes. The first involves
intellectual property law norms advanced by powerful countries and private actors. The second
involves indigenous rights norms advanced by marginalized groups, including against powerful
states and commercial interests.
I.
Intellectual Property as a Transnational Legal Order
Take first the example of intellectual property, which for a long time was a relatively sleepy, selfcontained regime, including at the time Jessup wrote. Under the 1889 Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property, countries were given great discretion regarding the content of
Gregory Shaffer (ed.), TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERING AND STATE CHANGE (Cambridge University Press, 2012);
Gregory Shaffer, How the World Trade Organization Shapes Regulatory Governance, 9:1 REGULATION AND
GOVERNANCE 1 (2015); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75:1 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW 181 (1996).
10
Halliday & Shaffer, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, 5, 18-21, 37-42; Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 183-86.
11
Shaffer, Theorizing Transnational Legal Ordering, 231 (providing a critical literature review of different modes of
theorizing the transnational).
12
Halliday & Shaffer, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, 7-11. For an example, see Gregory Shaffer, Nathaniel H.
Nesbitt & Spencer W. Waller, Criminalizing Cartels: A Global Trend?, in: John Duns, Arlen Duke & Brendan
Sweeney (eds.), COMPARATIVE COMPETITION LAW (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015), 301-344 (noting the shift in the
conceptualization of cartels as evil).
9
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patent law as long as they applied it on a non-discriminatory basis. 13 In the 1980s, however, a
group of private entrepreneurs in the United States formed a national association and then a
transnational network of private stakeholders to enroll the United States to press other countries to
link intellectual property law to trade agreements. 14 The movement successfully prompted the U.S.
government to amend its national trade regulation (Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act) to authorize
U.S. unilateral sanctions against countries that did not protect U.S. intellectual property rights. The
United States then used this leverage to press countries to agree to common public international
trade law rules to protect intellectual property, such as patents, in return for the United States not
acting unilaterally as prosecutor, judge, and executioner of trade law. The movement successfully
gave rise to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS
Agreement) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. Encountering resistance at the level
of implementation in many countries, the United States continues to press for new requirements
and review mechanisms through bilateral and plurilateral agreements and mechanisms.
The TRIPS Agreement is transnational law, in Jessup’s definition, in that it resolves a
transnational problem—that of a conflict between U.S. industrial and commercial interests and
developing countries regarding the recognition of intellectual property and the payment of
royalties. Yet, the TRIPS Agreement is also transnational in a deeper sense as reflected in the
socio-legal concepts of “transnational legal ordering” and “transnational legal orders.” These
concepts help unpack how the problem was framed (as a private property right implicating trade),
by whom (by U.S. and European private parties and their governments), and where the legal
response derived (from norms developed in U.S. and European law). And it shows the immense
transnational implications of the change in international law—including the creation of new
institutions to monitor enforcement at the multilateral level, giving rise to new transnational
accountability mechanisms under a particular normative frame; the creation of new institutions
within states to ensure compliance with TRIPS obligations (such as patent examining agencies and
administrative bodies and courts to hear and enforce patent claims); and the rise and empowerment
of new professions of patent examiners and intellectual property lawyers who have a professional
stake in the application of these legal norms. These developments, moreover, are dynamic,
involving interactions with domestic institutions, professions, commercial interests, and social
movements over time.
To give one example of domestic transformations, China did not recognize the concept of
intellectual property until recent decades, yet today it has created and expanded intellectual
property institutions, trained judges and administrators in these issues, and intellectual property is
now an important part of curricula in its law schools. Between 1997 and 2011, patent filings in
China increased 3,245 percent. China increased the number of patent examiners in its State
Intellectual Property Office, rising from 2,700 patent examiners in 2007 to 6,000 in 2011. 15 By

Laurence Helfer, Pharmaceutical Patents and the Human Right to Health: The Contested Evolution of the
Transnational Legal Order on Access to Medicines, in: Halliday & Shaffer, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, 311;
Gregory Shaffer & Susan K. Sell, Transnational Legal Ordering and Access to Medicines, in: Ruth L. Okediji &
Margo A. Bagley (eds.), PATENT LAW IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (Oxford University Press, 2014), 97-126.
14
JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION (Cambridge University Press, 2000), 203204.
15
Shaffer, How the World Trade Organization Shapes Regulatory Governance, 1. Regarding similar processes in
India, see Gregory Shaffer, James Nedumpara & Aseema Sinha, State Transformation and the Role of Lawyers: The
WTO, India, and Transnational Legal Ordering, 49:3 LAW AND SOCIETY REVIEW 595 (2015).
13
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2016, the numbers increased to over 9,000 patent inspectors in China, 16 who received 6,058,575
applications for recognition of Chinese patents (based on inventions), and who granted 1,464,115
patents. 17 China is now the largest issuer of patents in the world, surpassing the United States.18
In 2017, it ranked second in terms of international patent applications and third in terms of
international trademark registrations. 19
At the judicial level, China created specialized intellectual property divisions within courts
and, in 2014, specialist intellectual property courts in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. 20 These
courts have directly applied the TRIPS Agreement in dozens of private disputes. 21 In 2015 alone,
these specialist courts concluded 9,872 cases. 22 In 2018, China decided to establish a specialized
intellectual property court of appeal at the national level in order to foster uniform jurisprudence
in intellectual property law. 23 Housed in the Supreme People’s Court and headed by its VicePresident, the new court will hear all appeals against patent-related decisions from lower courts
from January 1 2019. 24 In three years, it is expected that appeals on other intellectual property
cases, such as copyright and trade secrets, also will be made to the new court. 25 Paradoxically,
China “has emerged as the world’s most litigious country in the intellectual property area,” with
16,010 new patent cases, 37,946 new trademark cases, and 137,267 new copyright cases reportedly
filed in 2017. 26 These developments are remarkable and involve much more than “transnational
problem solving.”
These developments in China are not simply foreign “transplants.” From a top-down
vantage, the government created its own domestic “indigenous innovation” policies to the
consternation of the United States and Europe. 27 From a bottom-up perspective, Chinese
中华人民共和国国家知识产权局 (STATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE OF THE P.R.C.), 年度报告 (ANNUAL
REPORT) (2016), 43, available at http://www.sipo.gov.cn/gk/ndbg/2016/201705/P020170505541250020396.pdf.
17
STATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE OF THE P.R.C., ANNUAL REPORT, Distribution of Inventions (Table 1) and
Distribution of Grants (Table 4) (2016), available at http://english.sipo.gov.cn/statistics/2016/12/.
18
World Intellectual Property Organization, Who Filed the Most PCT Patent Applications in 2017?
19
Who Filed the Most Madrid Trademark Applications in 2017?, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/docs/infographic_madrid_2017.pdf; Who Filed the Most PCT
INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
ORGANIZATION,
Patent
Applications
in
2017?,
WORLD
https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/docs/infographic_pct_2017.pdf.
20
Kristie Thomas, ASSESSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COMPLIANCE IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA (Palgrave
Macmillan, 2017), 143 (on specialized courts).
21
Congyan Cai, International Law in Chinese Courts During the Rise of China, 110:2 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 269, 286-287 (2016).
22
Thomas, ASSESSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COMPLIANCE, 144.
23
People’s Court News Media Corporation, The Supreme People’s Court Issued the ‘Regulations on Certain Issues
of the Intellectual Property Tribunal, SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, Dec. 28, 2018, http://www.court.gov.cn/zixunxiangqing-137461.html.
24
The Beijing News, The Supreme Law Intellectual Property Court Unveiled the Relevant Cases in Accordance with
the Law, TENCENT, Jan. 1, 2019, https://new.qq.com/omn/20190101/20190101A0FHFB.html.
25
Guo Liqin, SPC establishes IP Court, Paving the Road for a Uniform National Appeal Court, YICAI, Oct. 23, 2018,
https://www.yicai.com/news/100045081.html.
26
Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China, The Status of Judicial Protection of Intellectual
Property Rights in Chinese Courts 2 (2017-2018),
https://chinaipr2.files.wordpress.com/2018/06/2017e799bde79aaee4b9a6-2018041.docx; Peter Yu, Building
Intellectual Property Infrastructure Along China’s Belt and Road, 14 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA ASIAN LAW
REVIEW 8 (Forthcoming 2019).
27
Office of the United States Trade Representative, Findings of the Investigation into China’s Acts, Policies, and
Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation Under Section 301 of the Trade Act
16
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individuals invested in new professional careers focused on intellectual property and Chinese
companies hired and worked with them. In parallel, domestic constituencies that embraced
intellectual property protection and became rights holders engaged in information campaigns and
enforcement actions. 28 They worked to shape public awareness and attitudes towards intellectual
property, including among new generations of Chinese. In addition, as the Chinese became
wealthier, consumers became more interested in consumer protection, such as against trademark
fraud.
In other words, new public international law supported the dynamic development of a
transnational legal order for the governance of intellectual property that shaped state institutions
and professions which, in turn, interacted with new constituent demands. 29 Once one turns from
the concept of transnational law (and the more formalist connotation that concept conveys) to those
of transnational legal ordering and transnational legal order, one shifts one’s focus to the deeper
processes through which legal norms are constructed, framed, propagated, resisted, adapted,
settled, and unsettled.
II.
Indigenous Rights as an Emerging Transnational Legal Order
The indigenous rights movement provides an example of how traditionally marginalized
groups within states also have been able to harness public international law to develop and
transform legal norms and accountability mechanisms within states. We illustrate these processes
in a small developing country in Central America (Belize) and a highly industrialized country in
East Asia (Japan). In these cases, indigenous groups (the Maya and Ainu respectively) have been
able to use evolving public international law to advance their aims through transnational processes.
1. The Maya in Belize. In 2007, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the UN
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People (UNDRIP). 30 UNDRIP, in combination with
regional instruments and regional and international organizations, played a major role in catalyzing
the Belizean state’s recognition of the communal property rights of the Maya of Southern Belize.
The Maya of Southern Belize, namely the Ke’kchi and Mopan Maya, have been practicing
traditional land use and occupation since pre-colonial times, giving rise to claims of customary
land rights. The Belizean government, however, refused to recognize these claims, and began
granting logging concessions and oil exploration licenses in the mid-1990s. 31
In the 2000s, the Maya found allies for the recognition of their land rights in regional
institutions and Belizean courts by making claims under international law. Because of the initial
judicial inertia in Belize, and with the hope that an international body’s finding in their favor would
jumpstart domestic courts handling their claims, leaders of the Maya rights movement petitioned
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States (OAS)
of
1974,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, Mar.
22,
2018,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF [USTR Section 301 Report], 16.
28
Thomas, ASSESSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COMPLIANCE, 139.
29
Helfer, Pharmaceutical Patents and the Human Right to Health, 322-324; Shaffer & Sell, Transnational Legal
Ordering and Access to Medicines, 103-115.
30
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept.
13, 2007), 46 I.L.M. 1013 (2007).
31
Aurelio Cal et al. v. Attorney General of Belize, Claims Nos. 171 and 172 (Supreme Court of Belize, Judgment of
18 October 2007), ¶ 18, available at http://www.belizejudiciary.org/web/supreme_court/judgements/2007
/Claims%20Nos.%20171%20and%20172%20of%202007%20%28Consolidated%29%20re%20Maya%20land%20ri
ghts.pdf.
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in August 1998. 32 They requested that the Commission find that Belize was violating the human
rights of the Maya under the 1948 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, and to
make recommendations to resolve and prevent any future violations. 33 The Inter-American
Commission investigated and issued a merits report, delivered in October 2004, finding that the
government of Belize had violated the Maya’s communal property rights under Article XXIII of
the American Declaration. It maintained, “the right of property has an autonomous meaning in
international human rights law,” which include “indigenous communal property . . . grounded in
indigenous custom and tradition. 34 It also found that the Mopan and Ke’kechi Maya people
demonstrated communal property rights to the lands they inhabit in the Toledo district, and
Belize’s government violated these rights by failing to demarcate the Maya’s lands and by granting,
without first consulting the Maya, logging and oil concessions that could lie within these lands.35
The report cited case law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, opinions of the UN
Human Rights Committee, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, and
the Inter-American Commission, and provisions of international human rights law.
Unsatisfied with the government’s response, the Maya continued litigation before the
Belize Supreme Court. In 2007, Chief Justice Conteh of the Supreme Court recognized that the
Commission report was not binding, but found it “persuasive” for his determinations, 36 and
“fortified” his conclusions. 37 In his decision, the Chief Justice dedicated an entire section to the
Belizean government’s obligations under international law, which the government had violated.
He observed that Belize is a party to, and bound by, a series of international treaties that require
the recognition and respect for indigenous peoples’ property rights, including the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination (CERD), and the Charter of the OAS. 38 He cited determinations of UN
human rights bodies on these issues, including the UN Committee on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination, which found that non-recognition of indigenous people’s rights violates
CERD’s prohibition against discrimination. 39 He noted “that both customary international law and
32
Christina Coc, Director and Co-Founder of the Julian Cho Society, Address at Native American Law Students
Association at University of California, Irvine School of Law Symposium: Blood Quantum, Sovereignty, and Identity:
Contemporary Legal Battles in Indigenous Communities (Mar. 24, 2017).
33
Maya Indigenous Communities and Their Members v. Belize, Case 12.053, Admissibility Report No. 78/100, ¶ 6
(2000), available at http://cidh.org/annualrep/2000eng/ChapterIII/Admissible/Belize12.053.htm.
34
Maya Indigenous Communities and Their Members v. Belize, Case 12.053, Merits Report No. 40/04, ¶ 117 (2004),
available at http://cidh.org/annualrep/2004eng/Belize.12053eng.htm.
35
Id. at ¶¶ 127, 153. The Commission also found violations of Article II of the American Declaration regarding equal
protection of the law, and Article XXVIII regarding failure to provide judicial protection on account of undue delay.
Id. at ¶¶ 171, 186, 192-196.
36
Aurelio Cal et al. v. Attorney General of Belize, Claims Nos. 171 and 172 (Supreme Court of Belize, Judgment of
18 October 2007), ¶ 22, available at, http://www.belizejudiciary.org/web/supreme_court/judgements/2007.
/Claims%20Nos.%20171%20and%20172%20of%202007%20%28Consolidated%29%20re%20Maya%20land%20ri
ghts.pdf.
37
Id. at ¶ 100.
38
Id. at ¶¶ 118-134. He wrote: “I conclude therefore, that the defendants are bound, in both domestic law in virtue of
the Constitutional provisions that have been canvassed in this case, and international law, arising from Belize’s
obligation thereunder, to respect the rights to and interests of the claimants as members of the indigenous Maya
community, to their lands and resources which are the subject of this case.” Id. at ¶ 134.
39
Id. at ¶ 123 (referencing General Recommendation XXIII: Rights of Indigenous Peoples, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/52/18
annex V (Aug. 18, 1997); Id. at ¶ 126 (“These considerations, engaging as they do Belize’s international obligation
towards indigenous peoples, therefore weighed heavily with me in this case in interpreting the fundamental human
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general principles of international law would require that Belize respect the rights of its indigenous
people to their lands and resources,” including as reflected in the 2007 UN General Assembly
Declaration 61/295 on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). 40 He recognized that
UNDRIP, as a General Assembly resolution, was non-binding, but concluded that, as it is contains
general international law principles and was adopted by over 143 states at the time, including
Belize, it had special “resonance and relevance in the context of [the] case,” 41 and the Government
of Belize could not disregard it. 42
The Maya continued to press their legal claims before the Belize courts and the Caribbean
Court of Justice (CCJ), 43 the final court of appeal in Belize, referencing international law. In 2014,
in a claim challenging the Belize government’s granting of a permit for road construction and oil
drilling in a national park, the Belize Supreme Court enjoined the government from proceeding
until it consulted and obtained the prior consent of the Maya in relation to their property claims. It
held that “it is incumbent on the Government of Belize to put in place the legal mechanisms
necessary to recognize and to give effect to those rights belonging to the Maya which have already
been recognized by . . . the International Commission of Human Rights” under the American
Declaration. 44 It further held that “Belize, as a member state of the United Nations which voted in
favor of the [UNDRIP] is clearly bound to uphold the general principles of international law
contained therein” regarding consultation and prior informed consent. 45
In 2015, just before the Caribbean Court of Justice began hearing the final appeal, the
Belize government entered a settlement in which it committed “to create an effective mechanism
to identify and protect the property and other rights arising from Maya customary land tenure, in
accordance with Maya customary laws and land tenure practices.” 46 As a representative of the
Maya people told us, it was the condemnation before international bodies and domestic courts that
created the pressure on the government to settle before the CCJ decided. In her words “while the
government looks down on us domestically, when we are in the international front, it is hard for
them to ignore us. And so we have used the international mechanisms strategically . . . . We are
using a tool that does not belong to us to prove to the rest of the world that we exist and deserve
full protection of the laws for our lands.” 47
Because of the settlement agreement, the CCJ only decided whether the government
violated the Maya’s rights under the Belize Constitution and owed damages. In interpreting the
rights provisions of the Constitution agitated by the cluster of issues raised, particularly, the rights to property, life,
security of the person, the protection of the law and the right not to be discriminated against.”).
40
Id. at ¶ 127.
41
Id. at ¶ 131.
42
Id. at ¶ 132 (where the CJ references Article 26 of UNDRIP. According to Article 26, “States shall give legal
recognition and protection to these lands, territories and resources. Such recognition shall be conducted with due
respect to the customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned.”).
43
The CCJ is Belize’s final court of appeal since 2010 when Belize amended its constitution to abolish appeals to the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London.
44
Sarstoon Temash Institute for Indigenous Management et al. v. Attorney of Belize, Claim No. 394 (Supreme Court
of Belize, Judgment of 3 April 2013), ¶ 13, available at http://www.belizejudiciary.org/web/wpcontent/uploads/2014/01/Supreme-Court-Claim-No-394-of-2013-Sarstoon-Temash-Institute-for-IndigenousManagement-et-al-v-The-Attorney-General-of-Belize-et-al-.pdf.
45
Id. at ¶ 13.
46
Maya Leaders Alliance et al. v. Attorney General of Belize, CCJ Appeal No BZCV2014/002 (Caribbean Court of
Justice, Judgment of 30 October 2015), ¶¶ 9-10, available at http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/10/2015-CCJ-15AJ.pdf.
47
Coc, Address at Native American Law Students Association.
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Belize Constitution, the CCJ stressed that it was “aware of and accord[ed] great significance to
relevant international law jurisprudence, particularly the 2004 Report of Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (the IACHR) which made findings on the application of Articles
II and XXIII of the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man (the American
Declaration) to the claim by the Maya people to protection of their customary land rights (the Maya
Communities case).” 48 It referenced rulings of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
together with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 2007 UNDRIP. 49 In the end, it
found that the Belize Government had violated the Maya’s constitutional rights, and ordered the
government “to establish a fund of BZ$300,000.00 as a first step towards compliance with its
undertaking” in its 2015 settlement with the Maya. 50 International law, in other words, provided
tools that helped shift the balance of power between the Belizean state and indigenous groups
through its penetration into the Belizean legal system, backed by oversight by regional and
international institutions to which Belize is accountable.
Implementation was contested. After the CCJ’s decision, the Belizean government delayed,
for several years, taking meaningful steps to pass legislation to effectuate the terms of the parties’
consent decree. 51 The Belizean government continued to issue logging and oil exploration permits
without first consulting with or receiving consent from the Maya. As a result, the Maya returned
to the CCJ for further help in compelling the Belizean government to implement the consent decree
and a dispute resolution framework. 52 Because of the Belizean government’s foot-dragging in
developing the legislative and administrative structure to demarcate, recognize, and protect Maya
land rights, the Maya continue to utilize procedures before international bodies to pressure the
Belizean government to adhere to its domestic, regional, and international legal obligations. 53 In
light of the Maya’s persistence before the CCJ and international bodies, the parties are making
progress in realizing the terms of the consent decree and the CCJ’s decisions. 54
2. The Ainu in Japan. Indigenous communities have mobilized throughout the world,
including in countries that were not subject to colonial occupation and thus did not view
themselves as constrained by indigenous rights law. For example, the Japanese government long
viewed itself as a homogenous society, and refused to recognize the existence of the Ainu, an
indigenous group on the island of Hokkaido, as a minority group, much less as one protected by
indigenous rights. Indeed, so powerful were the government’s assimilationist policies that the Ainu
Maya Leaders Alliance et al. v. Attorney General of Belize, CCJ Appeal No BZCV2014/002, ¶ 8.
Id. at ¶¶ 54, 59.
50
Id. at ¶ 79.
51
Belize: Hearing at International Courts Demonstrates Belize’s Noncompliance in Landmark Maya Land Rights
Case, CULTURAL SURVIVAL, Oct. 26, 2017, https://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/belize-hearing-internationalcourts-demonstrates-belizes-noncompliance-landmark-maya-land.
52
Glenn Tillett, Caribbean Court Justice “Exasperated” with GOB’s Delay in Implementing Maya Court Order,
AMANDALA, Feb. 24, 2018, http://amandala.com.bz/news/caribbean-court-justice-exasperated-gobs-delayimplementing-maya-court-order/; Micah Goodin, CCJ Orders Barrow Administration to Get Serious About
Respecting Maya Rights; Micah Goodin, CCJ Orders Barrow Administration to Get Serious About Respecting Maya
Rights, AMANDALA, Nov. 1, 2017, http://amandala.com.bz/news/ccj-orders-barrow-administration-respecting-mayarights/.
53
Maya Leaders Alliance Advocates at United Nations Urging Respect for Rule of Law Belize, CULTURAL SURVIVAL,
May 8, 2018, https://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/maya-leaders-alliance-advocates-united-nations-urging-respectrule-law-belize.
54
Progress
in
Maya
Land
Tenure
Policy,
CHANNEL
5,
Mar.
15,
2019,
http://edition.channel5belize.com/archives/182042.
48
49

9

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3518536
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2895159

dropped the word Ainu from their association’s name in 1961 because of the word’s derogatory
implications at the time. 55
In 1979, the Japanese government ratified both the ICCPR and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which required the Japanese government to
report to these treaties’ respective monitoring bodies. 56 The government also served on UN human
rights committees, which placed it under more scrutiny from international human rights groups
and bodies. 57 In 1980, when the government was required to submit its first mandatory report to
the Human Rights Committee regarding minority rights protected under ICCPR Article 27, it
brazenly claimed that “minorities of the kind mentioned in the Covenant do not exist in Japan.”58
In the meantime, the Ainu had visited and formed linkages with indigenous groups in North
America and Scandinavia. These encounters helped catalyze and invigorate a greater sense of pride
in their indigenous identity. 59 Japan’s claim prompted the Ainu to organize a response. In 1986,
with the assistance of an international non-governmental organization, the Ainu initiated a
procedure before the new UN Human Rights Committee to report Japan’s violations of the group’s
rights. 60
International human rights law helped transform the Ainu movement’s sense of “actorhood”
and empowered and opened new opportunities for it. 61 In 1987, the Japanese government first
acknowledged the Ainu as a distinct group. 62 In 1992, it acknowledged that Ainu “may be called
minorities under (Article 27)” of the ICCPR in its third report to the Human Rights Committee. In
1997, Japan enacted an Ainu Cultural Promotion Law. 63 By 2008, the year after UNDRIP’s
adoption, fearful of embarrassment at Japan’s Universal Periodical Review before the UN Human
Rights Council and from potential protests at the Hokkaido G-8 Summit, the Japanese Diet passed
a unanimous resolution that acknowledged the Ainu as an indigenous group. 64 A year later, the
Hokkaido Utari Association changed its named back to the Hokkaido Ainu Association out of a
sense of pride and strengthened identity. 65 The Ainu’s engagement, in turn, reciprocally helped
consolidate indigenous rights norms and diffuse them for use by other indigenous groups in Asia. 66
Human rights activists and attorneys often use international institutions, such as the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights, the UN Human Rights Council, and the UN Human
Rights Committee as leverage to bring countries to the table, including when they formally lose
their human rights law claims in domestic courts. These bodies can be fruitful in affecting change
Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Human Rights and Minority Activism in Japan: Transformation of Movement Actorhood and
Local-Global Feedback Loop, 122:4 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY 1050 (2017); KIYOTERU TSUTSUI,, RIGHTS
MAKE MIGHT: GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND MINORITY SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN JAPAN (Oxford University Press,
2018).
56
Tsutsui, Human Rights and Minority Activism in Japan, 1059.
57
Id. at 1063.
58
Id. at 1066.
59
In his detailed empirical study, Kiyoteru Tsutsui concludes, “[i]f not for Ainu’s encounter with international
indigenous rights activities, it is highly unlikely that movement initiation would have happened for Ainu, especially
as an indigenous rights movement.” Tsutsui, Human Rights and Minority Activism in Japan, 1070.
60
Id. at 1066-1067.
61
Id. at 1066-1069.
62
Id. at 1067.
63
Id. at 1068.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 1069.
66
Id. at 1083.
55
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and in obtaining favorable settlements for their clients. 67 As these case studies illustrate, by turning
our conceptual focus to that of transnational legal ordering and transnational legal orders, we see
how norms penetrate and shape law, legal practice, and social identity within states. International
law, in sum, is not simply a technology that exists to solve discrete transnational problems; it
shapes state law, institutions, professions, and social identity. It does so dynamically and
recursively, often in response to considerable resistance. 68
C.

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW’S BROADER SCOPE AND DEEPER IMPACT
COMPARED TO JESSUP’S TIME

We started with concrete examples in two discrete subject areas of the broader and deeper
implications of public international law today for law, institutions, professions, social identity, and
accountability within states. Quantitative data illustrates the broader implications of public
international law across most areas of social life since Jessup’s time. International law has
expanded far beyond inter-state relations, as then understood. 69 It is now a key component in
transnational legal ordering and the creation of transnational legal orders.
In recent years, with the relative decline of U.S. and European economic power, the rise of
emerging economies, and the turn to security concerns since the destruction of the World Trade
Center in New York on September 11, 2001, some have posited a stagnation and decline of
traditional modes of public international law. For example, in a 2014 article, Pauwelyn, Wessel,
and Wouters argue, “formal international law is stagnating in terms both of quantity and quality.” 70
They point to the decline in the number of new multilateral treaties deposited with the UN
James L. Cavallaro, Toward Fair Play: A Decade of Transformation and Resistance in International Human Rights
Advocacy in Brazil, 3:2 CHINA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 481, 486-487 (2002) (“After eight years of litigation
in which the Brazilian state consistently and repeatedly missed deadlines and failed to engage the system seriously,
the Commission prepared a final report condemning the state of Brazil for violations of the American Declaration and
the American Convention on Human Rights. Shortly before that report was in its final phase of consideration for
publication, the Brazilian government expressed its interest in reaching a friendly solution.”); James L. Cavallaro &
Stephanie Erin Brewer, Reevaluating Regional Human Rights Litigation in the Twenty-First Century: The Case of the
Inter-American Court, 102:4 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 768, 787-788; 793 (2008); James L.
Cavallaro & Emily J. Schaffer, Less As More: Rethinking Supranational Litigation of Economic and Social Rights in
the Americas, 56 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL 217, 238-239 (2004) (“In varying degrees, states in the Americas (and in
the rest of the world) legitimate themselves through their insertion in international organizations, structures and
discourse. This internal legitimization process can empower actors—whether social movements, NGOs, or lawyers—
to the extent they are able to tap into the strength of international networks and intergovernmental oversight bodies . . .
[T]he force of oversight bodies goes far beyond their legal powers, which are rarely, if ever, what matters most within
the country whose abuses are subject to adjudication. It is the fact of international rebuke or condemnation that is of
greatest import to those seeking to challenge state abuses within a given country.”).
68
Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Recursivity Theory: A Review Essay of Halliday & Carruthers’ Bankrupt, 9:71
SOCIOECONOMIC REVIEW 371 (2011); Halliday & Shaffer, Researching Transnational Legal Orders, in: Halliday &
Shaffer, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, 500-503, 513-516. See infra Part E.
69
Jessup, TRANSNATIONAL LAW, 1 (preferring the term transnational law because “the term ‘international’ is
misleading since it suggests that one is concerned only with the relations of one nation (or state) to other nations (or
states).”).
70
Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses A. Wessel & Jan Wouters, When Structures Become Shackles: Stagnation and Dynamics
in International Lawmaking, 25:3 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 733, 733-734 (2014). In 2014, AJIL
Unbound likewise organized a special Agora on “The End of Treaties?.” Humberto Cantú-Rivera, The Expansion of
International Law Beyond Treaties, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW UNBOUND, May 9, 2014, available
at https://www.asil.org/blogs/expansion-international-law-beyond-treaties-agora-end-treaties.
67

11

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3518536
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2895159

Secretary General from an average of thirty-five treaties per decade between 1950 and 2000, to
twenty from 2000 to 2010. 71 They cite to parallel decreases in bilateral treaties, which dropped
from 12,566 in the 1990s to 9,484 in the 2000s, treaties transmitted to the U.S. Senate, and
international agreements reported to the U.S. Congress. 72 Overall, they highlight a turn toward
informal lawmaking through non-binding soft law.
These numbers, however, reflect neither a decline of public international law, nor in the
ongoing role of treaties and (more broadly) other forms of international agreements. First, the
number of new treaties is still significant. Second, the aggregate number of treaties continues to
grow. The comparison with the number of treaties in Jessup’s time is striking. In 1959, there were
7,779 treaties on deposit with the U.N. Secretary General, with 105 of them being multilateral
treaties. 73 As of 2014, around 56,500 treaties were on deposit with the U.N. Secretary General, 74
with over 560 being multilateral treaties. 75 Third, Pauwelyn et al. did not include amendments,
protocols, and annexes to treaties in their calculations. 76
Decline in the annual growth rate of new treaties also does not capture trends in state
ratification of treaties across issue areas. In trade law, the original membership of General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was 23 countries when it was created in 1948; by the
end of 2018, the WTO had 164 members. 77 In parallel, plurilateral and bilateral trade agreements
proliferated. In 1956, there were only two preferential trade agreements notified to the GATT,78
but by 2016, 419 were in force, and 625 had been notified. 79 For commercial arbitration, the UN
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards had only 25 parties
on December 31, 1958, the year it went into effect, but 153 countries are parties today. 80
Ratification of the six core human rights treaties likewise increased significantly, rising by over
50% from 927 ratifications in 2000 to 1,586 ratifications by 2012. That number increases by about
another 50% to approximately 2,000 ratifications if one includes the treaties’ optional protocols. 81
Likewise, there were no bilateral investment treaties (BITs) signed at the time of Jessup’s
lecture in 1956, as the first was signed between the Federal Republic of Germany and Pakistan in

Pauwelyn et al., When Structures Become Shackles, 734.
Id. at 735.
73
Adolf Sprudzs, Status of Multilateral Treaties—Researcher’s Mystery, Mess or Muddle?, 66:2 AMERICAN JOURNAL
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 365, 365 (1962) (noting that these are just treaties on deposit at the U.N.).
74
Introduction to Christian J. Tams, Antonios Tzanakopoulos & Andreas Zimmerman with Athene E. Richford (eds.),
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TREATIES x (Edward Elgar, 2014).
75
Overview, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, available at https://treaties.un.org/Pages
/Overview.aspx?path=overview/overview/page1_en.xml (last visited Apr. 2, 2019).
76
Pauwelyn, et al., When Structures Become Shackles, 734.
77
Understanding the WTO: The Organization, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, available at https://www.wto.org
/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2019).
78
World Trade Organization, WTO Analytical Index 88 (2012).
79
Regional Trade Agreements, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, available at https://www.wto.org/english
/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2019).
80
Paolo Contini, International Commercial Arbitration: The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 8:3 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW 283, 291 (1959); Status of
Treaties: Chapter XXII: Commercial Arbitration, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, available at
https://treaties.un.org/pages
/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXII-1&chapter=22&lang=en (last visited Apr. 2, 2019).
81
Navnethem Pillay, Strengthening the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Body System 17 (2012),
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/HRTD/docs/HCReportTBStrengthening.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2019).
71
72
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1959. 82 Since then, the number soared to almost 2,500 by the end of 2005, 83 and then rose more
slowly (as the number of remaining pairings decreased) to 2,860 BITs by mid-2013. 84 Overall, the
international investment regime consists of more than 3,300 agreements, which includes over
2,900 BITs and over 350 other treaties with such investment provisions. Litigation has soared
under them: In 1987, there was no recorded litigation under bilateral investment treaties, but by
the 2018 the number had climbed to over 900, rising rapidly. 85
Ratifications of these treaties are not about ad hoc problem solving; rather, the aim is to
reach deep within state law, institutions, and practices. Take human rights treaties, which is the
subject of considerable empirical research. Elkins, Ginsburg and Simmons show their impact on
national constitutions. After the passage of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
and the ICCPR, the number of rights found in national constitutions almost doubled. 86 The
inclusion of a right in the UDHR correlates with its inclusion in a national constitution by as much
as fifty percent. 87 After a country ratified the ICCPR, the similarity of the rights included in the
constitution to those in the ICCPR increased by almost ten points, controlling for other factors. 88
In terms of state practice, Simmons shows that for states in a period of democratic transition,
human rights treaties have significant effects by shaping executive agendas, supporting activist
groups litigating before domestic courts, and mobilizing domestic support. 89 As regards the
European Convention of Human Rights, Madsen shows its significant impacts within Europe. 90
Litigation before the European Court of Human Rights, for example, transformed the unwritten
constitution of United Kingdom (U.K.). 91 The U.K. “domesticated” treaty responsibility by
UNCTAD, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 1995-2006: TRENDS IN INVESTMENT RULEMAKING, (2007), 1,
available at http://unctad.org/en/docs/iteiia20065_en.pdf. During this time, there were some commercial treaties, such
as the U.S. signature of treaties of friendship, navigation and commerce, but they were not of the same nature in terms
of the depth and breadth of commitments, and in terms of giving rights to private investors to directly bring claims
against host states.
83
Id.
84
UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POLICYMAKING IN TRANSITION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
OF TREATY RENEWAL, available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary
/webdiaepcb2013d9_en.pdf.
85
Since many cases are kept confidential, the number is higher in reality. For statistics, see UNCTAD, Investment
Policy Hub, at https://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS?status=1000.
86
Zachery Elkins, Tom Ginsburg & Beth Simmons, Getting to Rights: Treaty Ratification, Constitutional
Convergence, and Human Rights Practice, 54:1 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 63, 76-80 (2013) (while
“nine constitutions written in 1947 contain an average of 17.6 rights, . . . the six written in 1949 contain an average of
31 rights”).
87
Id. at 80.
88
Id. at 87-88 (such as “controlling for the era and a country’s prior constitutional tradition vis-a`-vis the ICCPR”).
89
BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS 112-155
(Cambridge University Press, 2009); Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal
Scholarship, 106 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 22-25 (2012).
90
Mikael Madsen, The Challenging Authority of the European Court of Human Rights: From Cold War Legal
Diplomacy to the Brighton Declaration and Backlash, 79 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 141, 166-167 (2016)
(“Institutionally, the ECtHR became a de facto constitutional court for most member states because the Convention—
although in most dualist countries only having the status of statutory law—effectively governed human rights at a
transnational constitutional level.”).
91
Alec Stone Sweet, A Cosmopolitan Legal Order: Constitutional Pluralism and Rights Adjudication in Europe, 1:1
GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 53, 71-72 (2012) (“Under the UK Human Rights Act (2000), individuals may challenge
all acts, including Parliamentary legislation; if a Parliamentary statute is found to be incompatible with the ECHR, the
high courts are obligated to issue a ruling of incompatibility – but they may not set aside the offending legislative
82
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shifting authority for it from the Foreign Office to the Home Office. The treaty also catalyzed the
development of a new profession in the U.K., that of “specialized human rights lawyers,” which
since spread to other European states. 92
Environmental law shows similar trends. The modern period of major international
environmental agreements began in 1972 with the Stockholm Conference on the Human
Environment. 93 Since then, the growth of international environmental law instruments increased
steadily, with the number of multilateral environmental agreements more than doubling over the
twenty years leading up to the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de
Janeiro. 94 As of July 2013, the International Environmental Agreements Database Project reports
over 1,190 multilateral environmental agreements, 1,550 bilateral environmental agreements, and
250 other environmental agreements on deposit at the UN, 95 including nine new multilateral
environmental agreements since 2012. 96 In contrast, no multilateral environmental agreements
were in force at the time of Jessup’s lectures. 97
In addition, a decrease in the rate of new treaties does not indicate a decline in treaties’ role.
The number of new amendments to the U.S. Constitution is non-existent, yet no one would suggest
the end of U.S. constitutional law. Analogously, international courts and analogous bodies have
proliferated, and they interpret and apply treaties to new contexts. According to Alter, if we
exclude the GATT’s non-compulsory dispute system, only two operative permanent international
courts existed in 1956 — the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the European Court of Justice
(ECJ). 98 By 1956, these two courts together had issued only twenty-two binding judgments. 99 In
1989, at the tail end of the Cold War, the number of permanent international courts increased to
six.100 Alter reports that by 2013 there were at least twenty-four permanent international courts
that collectively issued 37,000 binding legal judgment. 101 And over one hundred other
international bodies interpret international rules, complementing these courts. 102 In sum,
provisions. Declarations of incompatibility are addressed to the Parliament, which must indicate what remedial
legislation, if any, will be proposed.”).
92
Madsen, The Challenging Authority of the European Court of Human Rights, 157.
93
Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée & Ellen Hey, International Environmental Law: Mapping the Field, in: Daniel
Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée & Ellen Hey (eds.), THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
(Oxford University Press, 2007), 1, 3.
94
Peter H. Sand, Evolution of International Environmental Law, in: Bodansky, Brunnée & Hey, THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 29, 35.
95
Data from Ronald B. Mitchell. 2002-2016, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS (IEA) DATABASE
PROJECTS, available at http://iea.uoregon.edu/page.php?file=home.htm&query=static (last visited Apr. 2, 2019) (Note
that they started recording MEAs from 1950).
96
Id.
97
Relationship between WTO and MEA Rules, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, available at
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_neg_mea_e.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2019).
98
Karen J. Alter, The Evolving International Judiciary, 7 ANNUAL REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 387, 388
(2011);
E-mail from Karen J. Alter, Professor, Department of Policy Science, Northwestern University, to Gregory Shaffer,
Chancellor’s Professor of Law, UC Irvine School of Law (Aug. 18, 2016) (on file with author).
99
Id. The ICJ issued ten and the ECJ issued twelve. Even if we include the GATT’s sixteen decisions by 1956, these
three adjudicatory bodies collectively only issued thirty-eight binding judgment by the time of Jessup’s lectures.
100
Alter, The Evolving International Judiciary, 388.
101
KAREN J. ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS, POLITICS, RIGHTS (Princeton University
Press, 2014), 4.
102
Alter, The Evolving International Judiciary, 388.

14

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3518536
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2895159

amendments, protocols, and annexes, coupled with treaty interpretation and application, show that
international treaties continue to be used to respond to an expanding scope of contexts.
The work of Pauwelyn and others, moreover, posits not a move away from international
public lawmaking, but rather a move to soft law and informal means of advancing transnational
legal ordering. The institutional architecture for international lawmaking has broadened and
deepened, giving rise to secondary lawmaking, and in particular involving soft law and informal
modes of reporting and peer review to oversee implementation of these norms. 103 These
developments have enhanced the scope and depth of international law across almost all areas of
social life. In 1956, the year of Jessup’s lectures, the UIA Yearbook of International Organizations
reported there were 132 intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and 985 international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs). 104 By 2018, the numbers skyrocketed to at least 7,726 IGOs
and 62,621 INGOs. 105 Even more importantly, early IGOs were much more constrained in their
power and area of coverage. 106 IGOs now play a much more significant role in establishing norms,
procedures, peer review mechanisms, dispute settlement, and other forms of intergovernmental
interaction, coordinating resources and expertise. 107
The development of international institutions has empowered INGOs, who are their
frequent interlocutors and partners. Intergovernmental organizations grant INGOs “observer or
consultative status, access to documents, and even on occasion, other forms of institutional voice
such as the power to distribute compromise legal texts during a treaty negotiation or to file amicus
briefs in institutionalized dispute settlement forums.” 108 INGOs, in turn, reciprocally help
intergovernmental organizations by diffusing international hard and soft law norms through INGO
networks within states, helping bring the norms home. They serve as intermediary norm conveyors.
These international organizations have been active in creating soft law, which aims to
shape national law and practice. Such soft law affects governance of areas traditionally seen as
strictly domestic, such as “financial regulation, consumer protection, and law enforcement.” 109
Accurately measuring the amount of soft law is impossible, but there is general consensus that it
has been on the rise for some time, with some arguing that it has become more important than hard

Gregory Shaffer & Mark Pollack, Hard and Soft Law: What have We Learned?, in: Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A.
Pollack (eds.), INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: INSIGHTS FROM INTERDISCIPLINARY
SCHOLARSHIP (Cambridge University Press, 2012).
104
UIA Yearbook of International Organizations 2015-2016, UNION OF INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS, available at
http://www.uia.org/allpubs?combine=&field_pub_year_value=&items_per_page=20&page=8&order=field_uia_pub
lication_nr_&sort=asc (last visited Apr. 2, 2019).
105
UIA Yearbook of International Organizations 2018-2019, UNION OF INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS, available at
https://uia.org/sites/uia.org/files/misc_pdfs/pubs/yb_2018_vol2_lookinside.pdf
(last visited Apr. 2, 2019) (reports data collected in 2017). The UIA Yearbook defines an intergovernmental
organization as one “composed primarily of sovereign states, or of other intergovernmental organizations.” The
Yearbook counts self-identified IGOs as IGOs. Ibid., § 1.3.
106
Esref Ertürk, Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) and Their Roles and Activities in Security, Economy, Health,
and Environment, 8:37 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY RESEARCH 333, 334 (2015) (as an example of an early
IGO, the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine established in 1815).
107
JOSE E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS (Oxford University Press, 2005), 589-619.
108
Jose E. Alvarez, Governing the World: International Organizations as Lawmakers, 31:3 SUFFOLK
TRANSNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 591, 597 (2008).
109
Jean Galbraith & David T. Zaring, Soft Law as Foreign Relations Law, 99 CORNELL LAW REVIEW 735, 747 (2014).
103
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law. 110 The proliferation of transnational legal orders comes not just from formal public
international (hard) law, but arguably even more from the explosion of soft law and the increased
scope that soft law instruments and mechanisms provide for creating, expanding, and deepening
transnational legal orders.
To view how a soft law process works, take the example of bankruptcy law. The UN
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has created principles and model codes
for bankruptcy law for all U.N. members. Those who participate most actively in the UNCITRAL
process are only a handful of members, such as the U.S. and European Union (E.U.),
complemented by professional associations, such as INSOL International (a global federation of
national associations of insolvency accountants and lawyers) and specialized sections of the
International Bar Association and the American Bar Association. 111 These actors help define the
problems that need to be addressed, and set the legal norms to resolve them. Some of the problems
are of a “transnational nature,” as contemplated by Jessup, in that some bankruptcies are multijurisdictional. Some of the impetus is also “transnational” because of broader concerns regarding
economic spillovers if financial crises are not contained through improved national bankruptcy
law. In all cases, however, the intended impact is much deeper than resolving discrete transnational
problems, as with private law. Rather, the impact is to reach deep within the institutional
architecture of the state, affecting the power of different state institutions, including executives,
legislatures, courts, independent agencies, and professions regarding corporate bankruptcy law. 112
D.

THE INTERACTION OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OTHER RULES IN TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL
ORDERING

The concepts of transnational legal ordering and transnational legal orders do not examine public
international law in isolation from Jessup’s other two components of transnational law: private
international law and “other rules.” Public international law interacts with them as part of broader
processes of transnational legal ordering, giving rise to the settlement and unsettlement of legal
norms in transnational legal orders defined by functional as opposed to territorial logics. 113 These
transnational legal orders may be constituted by a mix of public international law, private
international law, and private ordering. Some transnational legal orders rest on configurations that
rely more on public international law and others less so. Empirical research is needed to assess
variations and their relative importance for the institutionalization of legal norms in response to
different types of social problems.
At times, public international law and institutions operate as orchestrators by delegating
authority to and monitoring private legal ordering initiatives. Abbott, Snidal, and their
collaborators trace such orchestration processes in the fields of international health, environmental,
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finance, telecommunications, and labor law. 114 Reciprocally, private actors orchestrate public
international law and institutions, as exemplified by the role of private actors behind the adoption
of the TRIPS Agreement, 115 in drafting legal texts such as for bankruptcy law, 116 and in driving
interpretation through directly bringing claims, such as under indigenous rights law and
investment-state dispute settlement, or doing the legal work for states to bring claims such as in
trade law. 117 Public and private actors endorse and borrow from each other’s texts to advance their
goals. The WTO agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, for example, incorporates the
standards of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO); international investment
tribunals reference the International Bar Association’s guidelines for conflicts of interest and rules
for taking evidence; 118 and the International Tropical Timber Organization has endorsed the Forest
Stewardship Council’s standards. 119 Reciprocally, GLOBALG.A.P, a private organization that
certifies agricultural products, incorporates the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points
(HACCP) guidelines published by the UN Food and Agricultural (FAO). 120
Public international law also interacts with private international law. It authorizes the
privatization of dispute settlement through arbitration that displaces national courts. The 1958
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards recognizes, facilitates, and
legitimizes these privatized processes. 121 International treaties also govern some choice of law
norms, whether regionally (in Europe and to a lesser extent Latin America) or functionally (in
family law, with some developments in commercial law). 122 Public international law, private
international law, and private legal ordering are not simply alternative forms of transnational legal
ordering. They shape, complement, and support each other.
E.

RESISTANCE: THE RISE AND FALL OF TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERING

Transnational legal orders are not inexorable. They settle and unsettle; they rise and fall.
They often, if not typically, encounter strong resistance. 123 Such resistance arises because of
transnational legal ordering’s deep implications within states, especially when involving public
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law. Those marginalized from centers of power resist, as do powerful countries when they feel
constrained. Resistance can come from any direction, locally, nationally, and transnationally,
including through the engagement of other international organizations. Local actors may develop
legal doctrines or extra-legal strategies to foil transnational powers. 124 Non-governmental groups
may work to develop counter-norms at the international level, as done in the struggle to ensure
access to medicines to thwart internationally required patent protection through pressing for
responses from the World Health Organization and United Nations human rights committees. 125
Contests arise because of a transnational legal order’s successes. Its institutionalization
raises awareness that the stakes are high. The increased scope of public international law and its
penetration into domestic legal systems can catalyze populist, nationalist responses, as illustrated
in the United States and Europe, punctuated by the election of President Donald Trump in the
United States, the vote in the United Kingdom to leave the European Union, and the rise of
nationalist/populist parties and leaders in a number of E.U. countries, such as Hungary and
Poland. 126 Ironically, the United States and Europe were the architects of much of the transnational
legal ordering that has catalyzed such popular resistance.
Within national legal systems, legislatures and courts have raised screens to the legal
effects of public international law. Verdier and Versteeg code domestic legal system’s reception
of international law, and find “that while domestic rules generally give the national executive the
leading role in negotiating and concluding treaties, this power is increasingly constrained by
legislative approval requirements, constitutional review of treaties, and other procedures that
allocate authority—and sometimes veto power—to legislatures, courts and other domestic
actors.” 127 In the United States, the Supreme Court has created a presumption that international
treaties do not create rights of action before domestic courts, and tightened doctrine regarding the
direct effect of treaties in U.S. law without Congressional implementation. 128 The Court has
signaled that constitutional allocations of power to sub-federal states could also limit U.S. domestic
application of treaties, 129 and appellate court judges have signaled a narrowing of existing doctrine
124
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that takes account of treaties in interpreting domestic statutes. 130 Within Europe, national Supreme
Courts have become more resistant to accepting judgments of the European Court of Justice and
the European Court of Human Rights. 131 In December 2016, for example, the Danish Supreme
Court frontally defied the ECJ by refusing to apply the ECJ’s judgment in the AJOS case
(concerning the application of an EU directive on age discrimination) in light of existing Danish
law. 132
Nonetheless, where policymakers and stakeholders continue to view problems in
transnational terms, they often turn to law to address them. Given public international law’s deep
implications within states, there may be a turn to less formal, stealthier means of transnational
legal ordering, including greater relative use of soft law, private international law, and private legal
ordering to address transnational problems. The secular trend, we contend, will involve more than
ad hoc problem solving, and will continue to entail deeper processes of legal ordering that
transcend national borders to permeate legal practice within states.
F.

CONCLUSION

Public international law remains central to the concept of transnational law, both
empirically and normatively. It is even more central than when Jessup wrote his seminal lectures
and included public international law within his broader concept. Public international law is a
critical part of the concept today because of its deep implications for transnational legal ordering
and the creation of transnational legal orders. Empirically, international law has critical
implications for the role of markets (and thus what the state does), the allocation of power among
state institutions, the creation and role of professions, and the development of transnational
accountability mechanisms operating under particular normative frameworks.
This chapter stresses the bottom-up, top-down, and recursive nature of transnational legal
processes that give rise to transnational legal orders. It shows how the development of public
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international law is a place where domestic problems and domestic struggles—whether over
human rights, commercial law, or regulatory reform—get played out in international arenas
alongside domestic ones. States and private actors seek to “upload” domestic legal norms to
advance policies as well as to “download” and institutionalize them within and across domestic
jurisdictions. These processes are dynamic and recursive.
Public international law should not be viewed in isolation of private international law,
national law, and private legal ordering. Rather, much of public international law consists of the
uploading and export of national and privately developed legal norms, whether from powerful
states, professions, or other private actors. The resulting public international law norms interact
with private legal ordering and private international law, from arbitration to private standard
setting, from trade to human rights. Together, they give rise to transnational legal orders governing
different legal domains.
Normatively, the problems (and thus the issues at stake) are socially and politically
constructed, involving contests among actors. Public international law, as law more generally,
tends to have a slant in favor of the privileged. It accordingly must be subject to empirically
grounded, normative critique. At the same time, law is needed for ordering and the institutional
alternatives for ordering involve tradeoffs. Law constrains power as well as reflects power, and
power is needed to accomplish social ends. It is important to retain a public law element to
transnational legal ordering because otherwise, the concept of transnational law, as conceived by
Jessup, risks becoming disconnected from the public sphere. Public international law and
institutions are needed to address transnational problems, in complement with private international
law and private norm making. A critical role for transnational scholars is both to reveal the place
and roles of international law and institutions while critiquing their processes. An essential way of
proceeding is to evaluate transnational legal ordering through which legal norms are constructed,
conveyed, resisted, implemented, and have effects. Only then might we participate effectively in
improving the way things are.
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